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INTRODUCTION 
 crime occurs, and a cell phone is stolen. By tracking the phone, 
police believe they can also track the person who committed the 
crime. They have no suspects, no leads, and no warrants. But they do 
have a secret (and I do mean secret) weapon. They circle the streets—
one team on foot, another in a van—and fire up a small, box-like 
device. As they circle, they narrow their search, slowly focusing their 
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efforts on a single neighborhood, then a single block, then a single 
apartment complex. They enter the complex. They walk the hallways. 
They pause at every door and every window. Finally, finding what 
and whom they are looking for, they stop. 
What is going on? What tool allowed them to locate this suspect? 
The answer, the secret weapon, is a high tech surveillance device 
called a “stingray.” In this real Florida case, a stingray allowed the 
police to track down a single cell phone, and thus locate a single 
suspect, by gathering information from every cell phone in the area.1 
As police drove through the streets, each and every cell phone in the 
vicinity was forced to “register” with the stingray as it drew near.2 In 
other words, each and every cell phone unknowingly and 
involuntarily transmitted information to the police. Thus, as the 
search narrowed—down to a specific apartment complex—police 
began “lurking outside people’s windows and sending powerful 
electronic signals into their private homes in order to collect 
information from within.”3 Only by intruding on the privacy of 
everyone could the police determine the location of a single person. 
Stingrays and other forms of high tech surveillance have been the 
focus of many recent articles in legal journals and newspapers. From 
“Angel Fire,” the secret aerial surveillance system in Baltimore, to 
“Hemisphere,” the AT&T program designed to mine call records and 
analyze cellular data,4 government surveillance has fascinated the 
American public. With emerging evidence of widespread use, 
unsettled case law, and vignettes like the one above, it is no surprise 
that the warrantless use of stingrays by police is controversial. While 
many academic papers have tracked the possibility and importance of 
preventative measures to ensure law enforcement’s compliance with 
the Fourth Amendment, this Article examines what comes next. What 
happens—or should happen—after Fourth Amendment violations 
have already occurred? 
Part I of this Note discusses the technology: What are stingrays and 
how are they used by law enforcement. Part II discusses the current 
 
1 See Thomas v. Florida, 127 So. 3d 658 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Nathan Freed 
Wessler, VICTORY: Judge Releases Information about Police Use of Stingray Cell Phone 
Trackers, ACLU (June 3, 2014, 3:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-judge           
-releases-information-about-police-use-stingray-cell-phone-trackers. 
2 Wessler, supra note 1. 
3 Id. 
4 Kenneth Lipp, AT&T Is Spying on Americans for Profit, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 25, 
2016, 1:13 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/10/25/at-t-is-spying-on-amer 
icans-for-profit.html. 
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state of the law regulating the warrantless use of stingrays. Part III 
discusses current Fourth Amendment remedies for illegal acts of 
surveillance, specifically, the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained 
evidence. Finally, Part IV discusses alternative remedies that might 
fare better in this context. 
I 
INTRODUCING THE TECHNOLOGY 
A. Stingrays 
Cell-site simulators, known commonly by trade names such as 
“Stingray,”5 and “Hailstorm,” are box-like, portable surveillance 
devices that allow law enforcement agencies to collect information 
and locate cell phones using cellular networks. 
Cell phone networks are relatively simple to conceptualize. Each 
network provides service to a discrete geographic area by dividing 
land into “honeycomb-shaped segments.”6 Providers, such as Sprint 
or Verizon, equip each geographic segment with a transceiver, or 
“base station.” These base stations, frequently located on the top of 
buildings or other relative high points, receive and disseminate the 
radio signals that contain voice conversations and text messages 
within the boundaries of each segment.7 These base stations also 
collect data from those cell phones that are located within the 
segment, including “the strength, angle, and timing of the caller’s 
signal.”8 
As a cell phone moves through these segments, it automatically 
connects with the closest base station—the base station emitting the 
strongest signal.9 This provides continuous service as a phone moves 
from place to place, passing through different geographic regions 
served by different base stations.10 The phone also engages in a 
process called “registration.” All cell phones (when powered on) send 
a signal to the nearest base station every seven seconds, regardless of 
 
5 Although “Stingray” is the brand name of a device that is no longer widely used 
(largely replaced by newer models), this Article will use the term as an interchangeable, 
generic name for all cell-site simulators, as is common practice. 
6 Brian L. Owsley, Triggerfish, Stingrays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 
66 HASTINGS L.J. 183, 187 (2014). 
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whether they are “in use.”11 The base station “registers” the signal, 
and “[t]his registration process enables the cell phone to communicate 
with its network, transmitting information and data, including audio 
content.”12 
A cell-site simulator, used by law enforcement officers, mimics a 
local base station. Because the simulator emits a stronger signal than 
an actual base station, nearby cell phones will connect with it, 
mistaking it for the closest tower. Thus, a cell-site simulator “causes 
or forces cell phones in an area to send their signals—with all the 
information contained therein—to the cell-site simulator,” in essence 
registering with the simulator as it would with a cell tower.13 This 
connection allows the devices to collect a significant amount of data, 
including identifying information (for example, the international 
mobile subscriber identifier or IMSI number), metadata about calls 
(like dialed numbers and the length of calls), content (like text 
messages or voice calls), and data usage (such as visited websites).14 
Once deployed, these devices act indiscriminately; they intercept 
information from any and all nearby phones, not just from a 
specifically targeted phone.15 In addition, because these devices are 
portable and can measure signal strength, law enforcement can 
triangulate the geographic position of a specific phone by moving 
through different cells and taking various readings as they travel.16 
“The authorities can then hone in on specific phones of interest to 
monitor the location of the user in real time or use the spy tool to log 
a record of all phones in a targeted area at a particular time.”17 
B. Law Enforcement’s Use of the Technology 
Information about law enforcement’s use of these devices has long 
been cloaked in secrecy. Only recently, through creative discovery 
 
11 Id. at 188–89. 
12 Id. at 192. 
13 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Relating to Tels. Used by Suppressed, No. 
15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015). 
14 Cell-Site Simulators, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site  
-simulators (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
15 Cyrus Farivar, County Sheriff Has Used Stingray over 300 Times with No Warrant, 
ARS TECHNICA (May 24, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05 
/county-sheriff-has-used-Stingray-over-300-times-with-no-warrant/. 
16 Owsley, supra note 6, at 193. 
17 Ryan Gallagher, Meet the Machines That Steal Your Phone’s Data, ARS TECHNICA 
(Sept. 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-the-ma 
chines-that-steal-your-phones-data/. 
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requests from criminal defendants and exhaustive public information 
requests from civil rights and media organizations, has information 
about the expansive use of these devices started to emerge.18 For 
example, though details about these devices began appearing in court 
documents in 2012,19 certain federal authorities have been using 
stingray technology since the mid-1990s.20 
The systemic implementation of this secrecy is becoming more 
clear. The government, to protect the technology, has insisted on an 
extensive structure of nondisclosure agreements between 
manufacturers and law enforcement agencies.21 Specifically, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) signed a nondisclosure 
agreement with the Harris Corporation, the private company that 
produces and distributes the Stingray, Triggerfish, and other similar 
technology.22 Local authorities wishing to purchase the devices have 
in turn been required to sign nondisclosure agreements with the 
FBI.23 Even individual employees have been required to sign.24 
Since 2004, federal agencies “have spent more than $30 million on 
Stingrays and related equipment and training.”25 These agencies 
include the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), United States 
Secret Service, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
 
18 For example, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a civil liberties 
organization, has obtained documents relating to the FBI’s use of stingray technology 
through ongoing Freedom of Information Act litigation. EPIC has requested approximately 
25,000 pages of documents, 6000 of which are classified. In response, the FBI has released 
a few documents each month and a number of interesting details have emerged. For 
instance, the FBI has a manual called “cell tracking for dummies.” Certain details in this 
manual suggest that the FBI is aware that its warrantless use of stingrays is legally 
questionable. Ryan Gallagher, FBI Accused of Dragging Feet on Release of Info About 
“Stingray” Surveillance Technology, SLATE (Oct. 9, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.slate 
.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/10/19/stingray_imsi_fbi_accused_by_epic_of_dragging 
_feet_on_releasing_documents.html. 
19 See LINDA LYE, ACLU, STINGRAYS: THE MOST COMMON SURVEILLANCE TOOL 
THE GOVERNMENT WON’T TELL YOU ABOUT 7–8 (2014), https://www.aclunc.org/sites 
/default/files/StingRays_The_Most_Common_Surveillance_Tool_the_Govt_Won%27t 
_Tell_You_About_0.pdf. 
20 Gallagher, supra note 17. 
21 See Mike Katz-Lacabe, Non-Disclosure Agreements Between FBI and Local Law 
Enforcement for StingRay, THE CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVACY, https://www 
.cehrp.org/tags/nda/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
22 Mike Katz-Lacabe, FBI Won’t Say If it Has Agreement with Harris (But it Does), 
THE CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVACY, https://www.cehrp.org/fbi-wont-say-if   
-it-has-agreement-with-harris-but-it-does/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
23 See Mike Katz-Lacabe, supra note 21. 
24 Owsley, supra note 6, at 200. 
25 Gallagher, supra note 17. 
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Internal Revenue Service, United States Army, and United States 
Navy.26 Yet this device is hardly limited to federal use—state and 
local authorities in California, Texas, Wisconsin, New York, Florida, 
Illinois, Michigan, Maryland, Alaska, Washington, Oklahoma, 
Louisiana, and North Carolina also have confirmed access to cell-site 
simulators.27 
Law enforcement uses these devices for a variety of purposes. 
These include locating missing persons, kidnap victims, fugitives, and 
those who may have simply failed to appear for court.28 Stingrays can 
also be used to gather evidence for an ongoing investigation. In one 
New Jersey case, law enforcement used the device to build a case 
against a suspected drug dealer.29 In Miami, procurement records 
show that police officers obtained a stingray to monitor cell phones at 
a free trade conference in 2003.30 In San Bernardino, police admitted 
to using a stingray device more than 300 times.31 The Baltimore 
public defender’s office began to reexamine more than 2000 cases in 
which police secretly used stingrays after a 2015 newspaper 
investigation revealed a nondisclosure agreement between local 
police, prosecutors, and the FBI.32 
 
26 Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map 
/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
27 Id. 
28 Cyrus Farivar, Powerful “Stingrays” Used to Go After 911 Hangup, ATM Burglary, 
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 25, 2015, 4:45 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/02 
/powerful-stingrays-used-to-go-after-911-hangup-atm-burglary/; TALLAHASSEE POLICE 
DEP’T (2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1674421-03-27-2014-master-ce 
-log.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). 
29 United States v. Tutis, 216 F. Supp. 3d 467, 475–76 (D.N.J. 2016). 
By gathering identifying signals from many cell phones in proximity, and then 
gathering new samples from other locations where the suspect is present at other 
times, a law enforcement officer can narrow the list of identified cell phones to 
those that watch the suspect’s locations and eliminate the many that do not 
appear to follow the suspect from one place to another. By such process of 
elimination, the officer can deduce the phone numbers which may belong to the 
suspect, and then match those few numbers to numbers known to be involved in 
the illegal transactions. Thus, from an array of cell phone identification data at 
various locations where the suspect is known to be when the CSS is used, the 
officer can by process of elimination and deduction narrow the field to the data 
associated with the suspect’s cell phone or phones. 
Id. 
30 Gallagher, supra note 17. 
31 Farivar, supra note 15. 
32 Nicky Woolf, 2,000 Cases May be Overturned Because Police Used Secret Stingray 
Surveillance, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2015, 2:09 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us  
-news/2015/sep/04/baltimore-cases-overturned-police-secret-stingray-surveillance. 
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Although, as discussed above, cell-site simulators have extensive 
tracking and data gathering capabilities, the FBI has stated that it does 
not use stingrays to “intercept the content of communications.”33 The 
devices do, however, have the technological capability to do so.34 
Additionally, procurement documents indicate that the stingray can be 
used with compatible software to boost its capabilities. “FishHawk” 
software, for example, allows authorities to eavesdrop on 
conversations. “Porpoise” software allows law enforcement officers 
to capture and surveil text messages.35 
II 
STATE OF THE LAW: LEGAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST STINGRAY USE 
Different jurisdictions have responded in different ways as 
information about stingrays’ capabilities, and law enforcement’s use 
thereof, has slowly emerged. Some states have created statutory 
restrictions, requiring law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant 
before using cell-site simulator technology.36 The Department of 
Justice (DOJ), which houses the FBI, instituted a policy requiring 
federal agents to obtain a warrant and attempt a less-invasive search 
with a pen register (which tracks only telephone metadata) before 
using a stingray in criminal investigations (except in limited, 
exceptional, or exigent circumstances).37 Case law on when and how 
cell-site simulators may be used, however, remains scarce and 
conflicting. Information about the general constitutional protections 
and remedies of the Fourth Amendment is therefore helpful 
background. 
 
33 Gallagher, supra note 17 (emphasis added). 
34 LYE, supra note 19, at 3 n.23. 
35 Id. 
36 States that require warrants for real-time tracking include California, Virginia, 
Washington, and Utah. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, State Laws Start Catching Up to Police 
Phone Spying, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Mar. 24, 2015, 9:43 AM), https://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2015-03-24/state-laws-start-catching-up-to-police-phone-spying; Cyrus 
Farivar, Judge Rules in Favor of “Likely Guilty” Murder Suspect Found via Stingray, ARS 
TECHNICA (Apr. 26, 2016, 10:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/04/citing   
-unconstitutional-search-via-Stingray-judge-suppresses-murder-evidence/. 
37 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-
SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY 3 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/down 
load. 
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A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”38 As a basic rule, this means 
that law enforcement must obtain a warrant before conducting a 
search; warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions.”39 The first question is therefore 
whether a “specific action or intrusion by the government constitutes 
a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Amendment.”40 As a 
foundational matter, this question has given rise to a surprisingly 
complex and nuanced analysis. 
Historically, the Supreme Court construed the protection against 
unreasonable searches as one rooted in property—an officer who 
trespassed on or into the property of another conducted a search for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.41 In Katz v. United States, however, the 
paradigm shifted, with courts looking instead to an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.42 Any act that invades a person’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” is a search pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment and, thus, barring a handful of exceptions, must be 
judicially authorized by a search warrant. In Katz, when the defendant 
entered a public telephone booth and closed the door behind him, he 
manifested a reasonable belief that his conversation would be 
private.43 The Supreme Court thus held that officers’ use of a device 
that recorded his telephone conversation while in that telephone booth 
violated the Fourth Amendment.44 
Since Katz, numerous Supreme Court cases have construed and 
refined the meaning of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” In 
Smith v. Maryland, for example, a defendant challenged the 
admissibility of data collected by a pen register that recorded the 
phone numbers dialed from his home.45 The police requested the 
telephone company install the device without first obtaining a 
 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
39 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). 
40 Owsley, supra note 6, at 218 (quoting Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and 
the Right to be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 977, 983 (2008)). 
41 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). 
42 Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
43 Id. at 352. 
44 Id. at 359. 
45 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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warrant.46 The Court asked whether the defendant had “a ‘justifiable,’ 
a ‘reasonable’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’” in the numbers 
he dialed and ultimately concluded that he did not.47 In other words, 
because everyone knows that phone companies record dialed 
numbers, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to 
that information. Thus, no Fourth Amendment violation exists when 
officers access this information without a warrant. 
Smith v. Maryland was followed by United States v. Miller, in 
which the Supreme Court expounded upon the idea of the “third-party 
doctrine.”48 Under this doctrine, a defendant who voluntarily turns 
over information to a third party (such as a bank, phone company, or 
internet service provider) loses his “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in that information.49 In Miller, federal officers used a grand 
jury subpoena to obtain a defendant’s bank records directly from the 
bank.50 The defendant filed a motion to suppress the resulting 
evidence, arguing that because officers did not obtain a warrant, by 
seizing his records they violated his Fourth Amendment rights.51 The 
Court, however, concluded that the defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because he had voluntarily 
provided his information to the bank in the regular course of his 
various financial transactions.52 Consequently, the Court held there 
was no protected Fourth Amendment interest.53 
In cases where the government has conducted direct surveillance of 
a suspect, the Supreme Court has outlined a number of actions that 
violate the Fourth Amendment. In Kyllo v. United States, for example, 
the Court concluded that officers’ use of a thermal imager to detect 
heat emanating from a private home was a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.54 In United States v. Jones, the Court held that 
officers conducted an unlawful search when they trespassed, without 
warrant, onto the defendant’s property by installing a GPS tracking 
device on his vehicle.55 In Riley v. California, the Court unanimously 
 
46 Id. at 737. 
47 Id. at 740–42. 
48 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
49 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
50 Miller, 425 U.S. at 436. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 442. 
53 Id. at 445. 
54 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
55 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). 
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held that police needed a warrant to search the cell phone they seized 
during a search incident to arrest.56 
These cases, taken together, set the legal framework under which 
law enforcement’s use of stingray technology will be assessed. 
Without further direction from the Supreme Court, however, lower 
courts will likely remain split on whether the use of this technology 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search and whether law enforcement 
must obtain a warrant. Does a cell phone user maintain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his or her phone’s current location 
information? Stingray searches necessarily involve the direct 
interception of cell phone data. But do cell phone owners voluntarily 
provide their location information to cell phone companies in a way 
that might invoke the third-party doctrine of Smith and Miller? And 
does it matter whether law enforcement officers obtain real-time 
location information from a cellular service provider or obtain it 
themselves directly from a suspect’s phone by using a stingray to 
mimic a cell tower and thus intercept phone signals? 
B. Challenging Law Enforcement’s Use of Stingrays 
There are very few cases in which defendants have directly 
challenged the government’s use of a stingray. This stems, in part, 
from the systemic secrecy surrounding the technology.57 Some of the 
first cases to explicitly address the issue are United States v. 
Rigmaiden,58 Maryland v. Andrews,59 In the Matter of the 
Application of the United States of America for an Order Relating to 
Telephones Used by Suppressed,60 and United States v. Patrick.61 
While perhaps none of these cases provide a clear answer as to 
whether use of the stingray technology amounts to a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, each makes Supreme Court review more 
necessary and probable. 
The first case in which a defendant discovered and challenged the 
use of this technology came in 2012, with United States v. Rigmaiden. 
 
56 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
57 LYE, supra note 19, at 9. 
58 United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814, 2013 WL 1932800, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 
8, 2013) (order denying defendant’s motion to suppress); United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 
F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012) (order denying defendant’s motion for discovery). 
59 Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 
60 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Relating to Tels. Used by Suppressed, No. 
15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015). 
61 United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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Through creative discovery, a pro se defendant discovered that the 
government had used a cell-site simulator to locate his apartment.62 
Raising the issue in a motion to suppress, the defendant, with the 
ACLU as amicus curiae, argued that the government’s search warrant 
was deficient because it never disclosed the government’s reliance on 
stingray technology.63 Instead, it referenced only a “mobile tracking 
device” and gave no additional information about how the device had 
been used.64 The court disagreed. It concluded that law enforcement 
officers had no obligation to disclose their location tracking 
methodology and that referring to the cell-site simulator as a “mobile 
tracking device” described the search with sufficient particularity to 
render the warrant valid.65 
In Maryland v. Andrews, a state appellate court reached the 
opposite conclusion.66 In Andrews, the government requested and 
obtained a pen register/trap and trace order, then used a cell-site 
simulator to find a suspect accused of attempted murder.67 The police 
located the suspect inside an apartment, along with a gun.68 When the 
trial court discovered that police had secretly used a cell-site 
simulator, it suppressed all evidence obtained by the state as a result 
of the search.69 The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s decision to suppress, holding that the Fourth Amendment 
precluded the warrantless use of cell-site simulators and that the pen 
register order was not sufficient to justify the use of the invasive 
stingray technology.70 
 
62 LYE, supra note 19, at 8; Cory Doctorow, How an Obsessive Jailhouse Lawyer 
Revealed the Existence of Stingray Surveillance Devices, BOING BOING (Jan. 14, 2016, 
12:35 PM), http://boingboing.net/2016/01/14/how-an-obsessive-jailhouse-law.html; Cale 
Guthrie Weissman, How an Obsessive Recluse Blew the Lid Off the Secret Technology 
Authorities Use to Spy on People’s Cellphones, BUS. INSIDER (June 19, 2015, 5:04 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-daniel-rigmaiden-discovered-stingray-spying-tech 
nology-2015-6. 
63 Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800, at *14, *16. 
64 Id. at *16. 
65 Id. at *17. 
66 Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327–29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 
67 Id. at 354. 
68 Id. at 326. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 327, 360–61. Following this decision, at least one additional Maryland trial 
court has suppressed evidence obtained using a warrantless stingray. See Cyrus Farivar, 
Judge Rules in Favor of “Likely Guilty” Murder Suspect Found Via Stingray, ARS 
TECHNICA (Apr. 26, 2016, 10:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/04/citing    
-unconstitutional-search-via-Stingray-judge-suppresses-murder-evidence/; see also Kim 
Zetter, Spy Tool Ruling Inches the Stingray Debate Closer to the Supreme Court, WIRED 
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Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit neatly sidestepped the stingray issue. In United States v. 
Patrick, police secretly used a stingray to locate a defendant after he 
violated the conditions of his parole.71 Officers obtained a search 
warrant to track the defendant, but, like in Andrews, failed to disclose 
that a stingray would be used.72 After locating the defendant driving 
on a public road, officers discovered a gun in his car.73 Both parties 
conceded, for the purpose of the litigation, that use of a stingray 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search.74 While the court, in dicta, 
seemed to question this concession, it also noted that officers not only 
failed to reveal their plans to use a cell-site simulator, but also 
“implied that they planned to track [the defendant] down using his 
phone company data . . . perhaps misleading the judge by omitting a 
potentially material fact.”75 However, the court also offered that “[a] 
fugitive cannot be picky about how he is run to ground.”76 Thus, the 
court ultimately affirmed the district court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence “[b]ecause Patrick was visible to the general 
public, he did not have any privacy interest in his location at the time, 
his arrest was supported by both probable cause and a valid arrest 
warrant that had been issued before making any effort to learn his 
location.”77 The court concluded: 
Questions about whether use of a simulator is a search, if so 
whether a warrant authorizing this method is essential, and whether 
in a particular situation a simulator is a reasonable means of 
executing a warrant, have yet to be addressed by any United States 
court of appeals. We think it best to withhold full analysis until 
these issues control the outcome of a concrete case.78 
In a forceful dissent, Chief Judge Wood commented on the 
government’s deliberate secrecy and obstructionist behavior, noting 
that “[u]ntil recently, the government has gone so far as to dismiss 
 
(Apr. 6, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/spy-tool-ruling-inches-Stingray  
-debate-closer-supreme-court/. 
71 United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2016); Cyrus Farivar, 
Warrantless Stingray Case Finally Arrives Before Federal Appellate Judges, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 29, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/01/warrant 
less-Stingray-case-finally-arrives-before-federal-appellate-judges/. 
72 Patrick, 842 F.3d at 546. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 544. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 545. 
77 Id. at 542. 
78 Id. at 545. 
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cases and withdraw evidence rather than reveal that the technology 
was used.”79 He questioned whether the undivulged—indeed, 
purposefully concealed—use of a stingray exceeded the scope of the 
warrant and concluded that the district court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing to determine the full scope and capabilities of the 
technology.80 
As is clear from the sparse and conflicting cases above, there is 
little consensus on the constitutional status of stingray tracking. And 




Assuming for the purposes of this Note that stingray tracking is a 
search for Fourth Amendment purposes, a key remedial question 
remains: What actually happens if law enforcement officers do 
engage in warrantless stingray tracking? In other words, what 
remedies do and should exist for such conduct? 
A. The Exclusionary Rule 
The primary remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is the 
exclusionary rule.81 In general terms, the exclusionary rule dictates 
that evidence gathered by police in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment may not be introduced against the defendant at trial.82 
For example, a court should exclude evidence that police uncover 
after searching a home or vehicle without first procuring a warrant or 
relying on an established exception to the warrant requirement. 
The Supreme Court first established this rule as the remedy for 
Fourth Amendment violations in the 1914 case Weeks v. United 
States.83 In doing so, the Court noted that exclusion of improperly 
obtained evidence “was essential to the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”84 In a later 
case, the Court observed that without an exclusionary rule, the Fourth 
 
79 Id. at 546 (Wood, C.J., dissenting). 
80 Id. 
81 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROC. 56 (6th ed. 2013). 
82 Id. 
83 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
84 Eugene Milhizer, The Exclusionary Rule Lottery Revisited, 59 CATH. U.L. REV. 747, 
749 (2010) (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398). 
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Amendment would be reduced to a mere “form of words,” a right 
without a remedy.85 As Justice Brandeis further affirmed, “[t]o 
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies 
the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in 
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring 
terrible retribution.”86 
When Mapp v. Ohio later incorporated the exclusionary rule to the 
states, it also reaffirmed the Weeks Court’s justification for the rule.87 
However, in subsequent decisions, the Court shifted to its current 
conception of the rule—as a “judicially created remedy, rather than a 
personal constitutional right,”88 with the primary purpose “to deter—
to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard 
it.”89 In other words, courts exclude evidence to send a message and 
deter future wrongdoing by law enforcement, not to vindicate the 
individual defendant whose rights were violated by an 
unconstitutional search. 
B. The Exclusionary Rule Is an Inadequate Remedy for Stingray 
Violations 
The exclusion of evidence is an inadequate remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations in the context of cell-site simulators for two 
reasons. First, the government has a history of engaging in secretive 
tactics, using nondisclosure agreements, parallel construction, and 
misleading euphemisms to keep information about the technology 
hidden. This means that without additional safeguards, a defendant 
may never know whether a stingray was used to begin with. Second, 
because stingrays are frequently used to simply locate suspects (for 
example, missing persons and fugitives), there is often no 
suppressible evidence derived from their use. As a result, the 
exclusionary rule in this context fails in its primary purpose of 
deterring Fourth Amendment violations. 
 
85 Id. at 749–50 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 
(1920)). 
86 Id. at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)). 
87 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961). 
88 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.37 (1976). 
89 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
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1. Parallel Construction and Policies of Secrecy 
The government’s secretive polices, ostensibly in place to protect 
the technology and preclude suspects from deploying counter 
measures, take many forms. Parallel construction, nondisclosure 
agreements, and other tactics ensure that information about cell-site 
simulators rarely makes it into the courtroom. Through public-record 
and discovery requests, however, news companies, civil rights 
organizations, and defense attorneys have slowly started to piece 
together an understanding of the technology and its uses. 
Parallel construction is a tactic used by prosecutors and police 
departments to obscure the official use of cell-site simulators. It 
means “using Stingrays in the first instance, then reverse-engineering 
a case which they can safely bring to trial without mentioning the 
surveillance equipment.”90 For example, an officer might use a 
stingray to locate a suspect, then work backward to construct an 
evidentiary case without referencing the direct fruits of the stingray 
tracking. 
This practice has been documented in other contexts. For example, 
the National Security Agency (NSA) has long insulated its potentially 
illegal data acquisition from the domestic law enforcement agencies 
who use its fruits in criminal investigations: 
 When the NSA finds evidence of criminal activity within FAA-
acquired phone, email, and Internet records, it turns over “tips” to 
the [Special Operations Division (SOD) of a federal investigatory 
agency]. One federal agent estimated that about sixty percent of tips 
yield helpful information. Federal agents are trained to “sanitize” 
the information and cover up its origin as an FAA collection. For 
example, the SOD will tell a law enforcement agent “to look for a 
specific car at a certain place” and to “find his or her own reason to 
stop and search the car.” Agents are instructed not to reveal the tip 
in police reports or affidavits or discuss it with prosecutors or 
judges. Former DEA agent Finn Selander compared the process to 
“laundering money–you work it backwards to make it clean.” While 
the rhetoric of “sanitiz[ing]” and “laundering” information to 
remove tainted information may sound flagrantly illegal, these 
agents use such rhetoric so publicly because these practices are 
fairly common with other types of criminal investigations.91 
The same process may be mirrored in the context of stingrays, or it 
may be even more subtle. For example, law enforcement might refer 
 
90 Woolf, supra note 32. 
91 Amanda Claire Grayson, Note, Parallel Construction: Constructing the NSA Out of 
Prosecutorial Records, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S25, S33 (2015). 
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to a stingray as a “confidential informant.”92 Defense attorneys have 
reported hearing “[t]erms like ‘we located this phone using 
information from a confidential source,’ which sounds a whole lot 
like they had an informant; it doesn’t sound like they were using a 
sophisticated electronic device forcing all phones in the area to report 
back.”93 
Law enforcement uses other tactics to maintain the secrecy of these 
devices as well. These include requiring agencies to sign 
nondisclosure agreements, dismissing cases rather than revealing 
information in court, and using misleading language in police reports 
and even court documents. Indeed, defense attorneys and civil rights 
organizations have recounted the lengths that prosecutors and police 
will go to in order “to avoid being forced to reveal their use of these 
devices.”94 This might include using pen register/trap and trace orders 
for stingray tracking, “without much, if any, reference to the fact that 
the device to be used is a different type of electronic surveillance than 
the traditional pen register.”95 It might also include using less than 
candid legal authority for such requests,96 or using “inscrutable 
euphemisms” to obscure sources and technology.97 For example, 
while the government in Rigmaiden eventually admitted to using a 
cell-site simulator, the original warrant request made only fleeting 
reference to an unspecified “mobile tracking device.”98 The device 
was described as “mobile tracking equipment [that] ultimately 
generate[s] a signal that fixes the geographic position of the Target 
[Device].”99 The request for a warrant gave no additional information 
about how the device actually functioned. Significantly, the phrase 
“mobile tracking device” “typically refers to GPS devices (or so-
 
92 E-mail from Kenneth Castro, Sergeant, Sarasota Police Dep’t, to Terry Lewis, Chief 
of Police, N. Point Police Dep’t (Apr. 15, 2009, 11:25 AM), https://www.aclu.org/sites 
/default/files/assets/aclu_florida_stingray_police_emails.pdf [hereinafter Castro E-mail]. 
93 Woolf, supra note 32. In addition, “[a]ccording to emails obtained by the ACLU of 
Florida through a public records request, police officers with the Sarasota Police 
Department in Florida ‘[i]n reports or depositions’ ‘simply refer [to information from an 
IMSI catcher] as ‘. . . information from a confidential source regarding the location of the 
suspect.’ They have done so ‘at the request of the U.S. Marshalls.’” LYE, supra note 19, at 
10 n.63. 
94 Woolf, supra note 32. 
95 Owsley, supra note 6, at 200. 
96 Id. 
97 Woolf, supra note 32. 
98 LYE, supra note 19, at 6–7. 
99 Id. at 7. 
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called ‘bumper beepers’),” rather than a cell-site simulator.100 While 
the Rigmaiden court found this description sufficient, other courts 
have flagged the use of such misleading language. The Patrick court 
noted that law enforcement officers clearly “implied that they planned 
to track [the defendant] down using his phone company’s data . . . 
perhaps misleading the judge by omitting a potentially material 
fact.”101 This observation did not, however, change the court’s 
analysis or conclusion. 
Nondisclosure agreements have also greatly limited the 
exclusionary rule’s efficacy in deterring police misconduct by 
mandating widespread secrecy. In Florida, for example, public-
records requests revealed e-mails that discussed how police 
departments, at the request of federal agencies, obscure information 
about the devices. Specifically, when one detective was “too explicit 
in a probable cause affidavit (PCA), specifically detailing ‘the 
investigative means used to locate the suspect,’” the department was 
asked to “seal the old affidavit and submit a new, more vague 
one.”102 One e-mail openly stated: 
In the past, and at the request of the U.S. Marshalls [sic], the 
investigative means utilized to locate the suspect have not been 
revealed so that we may continue to utilize this technology without 
the knowledge of the criminal element. In reports or depositions we 
simply refer to the assistance as “received information from a 
confidential source regarding the location of the suspect.” To date 
this has not been challenged.103 
These nondisclosure agreements also often include clauses 
requiring the prosecution to dismiss charges rather than disclose 
information about the use of stingray technology.104 For example, the 
 
100 Id. at 9. 
101 United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 2016). 
102 Castro E-mail, supra note 92; Megan Geuss, Cops Hid Use of Phone Tracking Tech 
in Court Documents at Feds’ Request, ARS TECHNICA (June 19, 2014, 9:01 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/cops-hid-use-of-phone-tracking-tech-in-court    
-documents-at-feds-request/. 
103 Castro E-mail, supra note 92. 
104 Farivar, supra note 15 (“[T]he [San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department], like other 
departments nationwide, maintains a questionable non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with 
the FBI that indicates that the agency will work with local prosecuting authority to dismiss 
cases rather than reveal information in court about stingrays [sic].”); see also Castro E-
mail, supra note 92; Memorandum from Christopher M. Piehota, Special Agent in Charge, 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Scott R. Patronik, Chief, Erie Cty. Sheriff’s Office, (June 
29, 2012), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1727748-non-disclosure agreement 
.html#document/p3/a212440 [hereinafter Piehota Memorandum]. 
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Patrick court noted that “[u]ntil recently, the government has gone so 
far as to dismiss cases and withdraw evidence rather than reveal that 
the technology was used.”105 
Other examples come directly from newly revealed nondisclosure 
agreements. One signed by the Erie County Sheriff’s office in New 
York states: 
[T]he Erie County Sheriff’s Office will, at the request of the FBI, 
seek dismissal of the case in lieu of using or providing, or allowing 
others to use or provide, any information concerning the Harris 
Corporation wireless collection equipment/technology, its 
associated software, operating manuals, and any related 
documentation (beyond the evidentiary results obtained through the 
use of the equipment/technology), if using or providing such 
information would potentially or actually compromise the 
equipment/technology. This point supposes that the agency has 
some control or influence over the prosecutorial process. Where 
such is not the case, or is limited so as to be inconsequential, it is 
the FBI’s expectation that the law enforcement agency identify the 
applicable prosecuting agency, or agencies, for inclusion in this 
agreement.106 
Dismissals attributable to nondisclosure agreements are not 
unheard of. In St. Louis, prosecutors dropped charges against the 
alleged getaway driver in a string of robberies after the defense 
learned that police had used a stingray in her case.107 In New York, 
the FBI “instructed the police to drop criminal charges instead of 
revealing ‘any information concerning the cell site simulator or its 
use.’”108 In Tallahassee, prosecutors offered a defendant charged with 
robbery with a deadly weapon the “deal of the century”—six months 
of probation—to avoid allowing the defense to examine the stingray 
used to locate him.109 
In Andrews, after a suppression hearing, the court squarely 
addressed the State’s nondisclosure agreement and its effects on the 
 
105 Patrick, 842 F.3d at 546. 
106 Piehota Memorandum, supra note 104, at 3. 
107 Cyrus Farivar, Robbery Suspect Pulls Guilty Plea After Stingray Disclosure, Case 
Dropped, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 29, 2015, 2:04 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy 
/2015/04/alleged-getaway-driver-challenges-Stingray-use-robbery-case-dropped/. 
108 Jose Pagliery, FBI Lets Suspects Go to Protect ‘Stingray’ Secrets, CNNMONEY 
(Mar. 18, 2015 3:15 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/18/technology/security/police      
-Stingray-phone-tracker/. 
109 Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment Proves a Case’s 
Undoing, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national    
-security/secrecy-around-police-surveillance-equipment-proves-a-cases-undoing/2015/02 
/22/ce72308a-b7ac-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html; Pagliery, supra note 108. 
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court. There, the nondisclosure agreement required “the Office of the 
State’s Attorney for Baltimore [to], at the request of the FBI, seek 
dismissal of the case in lieu of using or providing, or allowing others 
to provide, any information concerning the Harris Corporation 
wireless collection equipment/technology[.]”110 The court indicated 
that the agreement and the State’s resulting actions were problematic. 
By attempting to protect the technology and adhere to the 
nondisclosure agreement, the State “prevent[ed] the court from 
exercising its fundamental duties under the Constitution.”111 
Specifically, without the necessary information, the court could not 
determine whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment and concluded that the State’s actions were “inimical to 
the constitutional principles we revere.”112 
Such secretive tactics might help explain why so few judicial 
decisions address the use of these electronic surveillance devices. 
Defense attorneys do not know what red flags to look for, what to ask 
for, or when to ask for it. Policies of secrecy inhibit the development 
of regulating case law. Even if defendants discover stingray use in 
their case and attempt to challenge such use in court, restrictive 
nondisclosure agreements often mandate that police and prosecutors 
withdraw or even drop the case rather than risk revealing stingray 
use.113 If the information does not emerge to begin with, the 
exclusionary rule cannot come into play. Thus, the exclusionary rule 
is again ineffective to deter police misconduct in this context. 
2. Additional Complications Based on “Whom” Law Enforcement 
Targets 
The exclusionary rule in the context of stingrays is particularly 
problematic for another reason: Stingrays are not only used to build 
cases against suspects; they are often used to recover fugitives, FTAs, 
and missing persons. If no additional information is found in the 
course of location and arrest, there might be no derivative evidence to 
suppress. For example, if police are required to obtain a warrant 
before using a stingray, but instead use the device, without a warrant, 
to locate someone who violates parole, what then? Assuming police 
find no additional evidence of a crime on his person, what can be 
 
110 Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 338 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (alteration in 
original). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 339. 
113 Woolf, supra note 32. 
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suppressed using the exclusionary rule? The arrest itself may be 
allowed in, but what about the location? 
In Patrick, the Seventh Circuit wrote: 
 A person wanted on probable cause (and an arrest warrant) who 
is taken into custody in a public place, where he had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy, cannot complain about how the police 
learned his location. Recall that the cell‐site simulator (unlike the 
GPS device in Jones) was not used to generate the probable cause 
for arrest; probable cause to arrest Patrick predated the effort to 
locate him. From his perspective, it is all the same whether a paid 
informant, a jilted lover, police with binoculars, a bartender, a 
member of a rival gang, a spy trailing his car after it left his 
driveway, the phone company’s cell towers, or a device pretending 
to be a cell tower, provided location information. A fugitive cannot 
be picky about how he is run to ground. So it would be 
inappropriate to use the exclusionary rule, even if the police should 
have told the judge that they planned to use a cell‐site simulator to 
execute the location warrant.114 
In Patrick, of course, the police found evidence of an additional 
crime during the course of Patrick’s arrest.115 As the court seems to 
recognize, however, the exclusionary rule cannot apply to a 
defendant’s location alone: “fugitive[s] cannot be picky about how 
[they are] run to ground.”116 Thus, even when the police obtained a 
warrant through deceptive and misleading wording, the court still 
concluded that locating the defendant with a cell-site simulator did 
not warrant the suppression of evidence. It follows then, that where 
no additional evidence is found, the result would be just as clear—
there would be nothing to which to apply the exclusionary rule. 
More broadly, while suppression may be sufficient in a case like 
Andrews, where police found incriminating evidence upon locating 
the defendant, the same is not true in the case where no incriminating 
evidence is discovered.117 For certain cases—where someone is 
missing, failed to appear for court, violated parole, or is on the run—
officers’ primary concern may not be looking for evidence at all. 
Instead, police may be interested in location alone. In such cases, 
once the person is located, if there is no other incriminating evidence 
to suppress, there is no further debate on Fourth Amendment 
remedies. Unlike evidentiary suppression, outright dismissal is not a 
 
114 United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2016). 
115 Id. at 542. 
116 Id. at 545. 
117 See Nakashima, supra note 109. 
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Fourth Amendment remedy. In these cases, though the device itself 
has been used no differently, with no evidence to introduce there is no 
evidence to suppress, and, thus, the exclusionary rule loses its 
deterrence value. 
Furthermore, from a law enforcement perspective, the potential 
gain (finding a fugitive) may outweigh any potential loss (suppressed 
evidence in a new prosecution). Moreover, because the device is 
frequently used to locate suspects, not just to build a case against one, 
in the situation described above, there may be no downside to the 
violation at all. Law enforcement may very well locate a suspect 
without finding additional evidence to suppress in the first place. 
Thus, the incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment may be even 
higher here than elsewhere. This is directly at odds with the primary 
purpose of the exclusionary rule—to deter Fourth Amendment 
violations in the first instance. If the benefit of violating the Fourth 
Amendment clearly outweighs any possible harm from such a 
violation, then the rule as a remedy is ineffective. 
C. So What? 
While this calculus may not be unique to the stingray context, there 
is something distinct here: When used, stingrays collect data on 
everyone. Stingrays do not narrowly target a single, suspicious cell 
phone. Instead, they gather information from all phones in the area—
innocent and guilty phones alike. Unlike a situation where police 
might, for example, conduct a search of an individual without 
probable cause or warrant, when a stingray is used, it interferes with 
and gathers data on every single phone in the vicinity. 
Moreover, when engaged, stingrays do not stop the process of 
forced registration at the threshold of the home or other private areas. 
Instead, they continue to gather information from the phone wherever 
it may be located. And we take our phones everywhere—to work, to 
school, even to bed. This means that a stingray will continue to 
extract information even from locations where there is a well-
established reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Stingrays cast a wide, indiscriminate net of surveillance, and the 
sheer number of potentially affected people is significant. Ninety-five 
percent of Americans own cell phones.118 Seventy-seven percent of 
 
118 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet 
.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. 
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Americans own smart phones.119 As the technological capabilities of 
phones grow—allowing us to send e-mail, search the web, pay our 
bills—so too does the amount of information that can be uncovered 
through stingray-type technology. Real-time location tracking has the 
potential to reveal our work schedules, our religions, our medical 




While the exclusionary rule is the primary remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations, other alternatives do exist. In this context, for 
example, the judiciary or legislature could shift its focus to the 
individual officers who engage in unconstitutional searches and 
seizures or the prosecutors who obscure this information in later 
cases. This might mean implementing police review boards with the 
authority to discipline or fire officers for constitutional wrongdoing. It 
might mean increasing criminal penalties for illegal surveillance 
generally, or increasing penalties for officers who use their official 
role to engage in illegal surveillance. It might include appointing 
special prosecutors, insulated from the constraints of the “team” 
mentality that develops between prosecutors and law enforcement 
agents who work together on a daily basis. Such prosecutors might be 
more willing to crack down on law enforcement agents who violate 
existing laws, like invasion of privacy or trespass. Alternatively, 
states or the federal government could authorize civil suits against 
individual officers and the agencies for which they work. These civil 
suits might result in compensatory and punitive damages, or even 
injunctive relief. With such stakes, both individual officers and their 
government agencies would have a significant incentive to comply, 
and ensure compliance, with the rules. 
Though perhaps unlikely in today’s political climate, top-down 
policies might also have a role here. While the DOJ has had, at least 
in the past, a policy that required law enforcement to obtain a warrant 
before using a stingray, these policies could go further. The FBI could 
refuse to sign nondisclosure agreements with the private companies 
that sell these devices. In criminal cases, prosecutors could be 
required by their offices to disclose all stingray use upfront. With 
information more readily available to all parties, the courts could 
 
119 Id. 
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begin overseeing and instituting appropriate safeguards that 
adequately uphold constitutional rights. 
Each of these options has obvious drawbacks. Policies are unstable 
and subject to change with each administration. Pushback from law 
enforcement is likely. In fact, police unions and employment 
protections gained through collective bargaining might preclude 
citizen review boards from disciplining or firing police officers. 
While civil suits against officers for their constitutional violations are 
already authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens,120 plaintiffs 
frequently run up against immunity doctrines. These doctrines, in 
essence, insulate officers from suit in all situations where a right is 
not clearly established at the time of the violation. This is especially 
problematic in cases of stingray surveillance, where the legal issues 
remain decidedly unsettled. 
While these alternatives may not be perfect, they do move us one 
step closer to a viable remedy. Perhaps the most effective solution 
would be to combine these reactionary remedies with additional front-
end deterrence mechanisms. This might mean advocating for statutory 
or judicial warrant requirements. Statutory warrant requirements 
could mimic, for example, the Federal Wiretap Act, which “provides 
a comprehensive scheme that strictly limits law enforcement’s use of 
electronic surveillance and provides several mechanisms to ensure 
that surveillance stays within legal bounds.”121 
Developing case law could provide another important limit. For 
example, one Illinois district court devised three requirements for law 
enforcement to follow when using a cell-site simulator by balancing 
the competing interests of effective law enforcement with those 
privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.122 First, the 
court determined that “law enforcement officers must make 
reasonable efforts to minimize the capture of signals emitted from cell 
phones used by people other than the target of the investigation.” This 
includes such reasonable measures as not using the “cell-site 
simulator when, because of the location and time, an inordinate 
number of innocent third parties’ information will be collected.” 
Second, the court required law enforcement to “destroy all data other 
than the data identifying the cell phone used by the target” within 
 
120 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
121 Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 
56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 13 (2004). 
122 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Relating to Tels. Used by Suppressed, No. 
15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015). 
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forty-eight hours.123 Finally, the court prohibited law enforcement 
from using any of the acquired data “beyond that necessary to 
determine the cell phone information of the target.”124 Encouraging 
the development of such concrete requirements and limits could help 
protect both defendants and the public at large. 
Thus, perhaps the most effective solution would be to combine 
front-end warrant requirements—laid out by either statute or case 
law—with additional remedies as laid out above. 
CONCLUSION 
Should public safety concerns override the privacy intrusions that 
result from stingray surveillance? Even if law enforcement were to 
limit its use of the device—only tracking fleeing felons or kidnap 
victims and otherwise purging all data gathered from “innocent” 
phones—do the ends justify the means? 
This Note posits that the answer is no. Stingrays are not 
technologically limited to tracking escaped felons and kidnap victims. 
Rather, they allow law enforcement to engage in real-time tracking, of 
anyone, without limit. They can capture identifying information, data 
usage, and content from every phone in a geographic area.125 Without 
oversight from the courts, there is no guarantee of targeted use, 
probable cause, or the protection of any individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
Law enforcement agencies have proven, in this context, that they 
are unwilling to be open about their use of these devices. Emerging 
case law, applications for public records, and discovery requests have 
demonstrated how nondisclosure agreements and other tactics are 
used to ensure widespread secrecy. While law enforcement agencies 
have stated that, despite the stingray’s impressive capabilities, they 
use these devices only to locate individual suspects and otherwise 
ignore or delete any extraneous information they gather, secretive 
practices should make us cautious about accepting such statements at 
face value. 
What is clear is that our current remedies are insufficient. Self-
imposed limitations, like institutional policies, do not adequately 
protect constitutional rights. Case law is just beginning to develop on 
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the topic, and there is no guarantee that courts or legislatures will 
require law enforcement to obtain warrants before using stingrays. 
Indeed, to date, only one court—a state appellate court in Maryland—
has definitively concluded that, under the Fourth Amendment, police 
must obtain a warrant before using a stingray. Only a few states have 
instituted statutory warrant requirements directed specifically at 
stingrays.126 
While there may be value in this technology, there are also 
undeniable pitfalls. As Justice Brandeis wrote in Olmstead v. United 
States, 
[i]f the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for 
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law 
the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may 
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private 
criminal-would bring terrible retribution.127 
The ends cannot justify the means, and a system dominated by 
secrecy—with scarce remedies for constitutional violations—is an 
alarming system indeed. 
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